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Macroeconomic and monetary policies from
the "eductive" viewpoint∗
Roger Guesnerie
Collège de France, Paris School of Economics
January 20th, 2008
Abstract
The "eductive" viewpoint provides a theoretically sophisticated
analysis as well as an intuitively plausible shortcut to the study of
expectational coordination in economic models. From the review of
expectational criteria in a class of dynamical models of macroeco-
nomic theory, the paper shows how such an "eductive" viewpoint
completes and deepens rather than contradicts standard analysis. It
however argues that the "eductive" approach, when correctly imple-
mented, challenges the conditions of learning in infinite-horizon mod-
els with infinitely-lived agents. In particular, in a simple monetary
model adopting such a framework, Taylor rules may be stabilizing, in
the demanding sense under scrutiny, but only within a small window
for the reaction coeﬃcient.
Résumé : Le point de vue dit "divinatoire" fournit à la fois une
alternative théoriquement élaborée et un raccourci intuitivement plau-
sible à l’étude de la coordination des anticipations. Il conduit à appro-
fondir l’analyse standard, comme le montre, à partir d’une revue de
familles de modèles dynamiques utilisés en macroéconomie, l’examen
∗I thank participants to the November meeting at the Central Bank of Chile for their
constructive remarks. I thank Carl Walsh for useful comments on an earlier draf and X.
Ragot for discussions on these issues. I am specially grateful to A. d’Autume, for pointing
out an error in a previous version. Also, Section 6 significantly borrows from the joint
study of "eductive" learning in RBC like models undertaken with G. Evans and B. Mc
Gough. (see references in the bibliography)
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et la comparaison des critères habituellement utilisés. Cependant,
le point de vue, lorsqu’il est convenablement compris, conduit à un
réexamen profond de l’apprentissage dans les modèles à horizon infini
peuplés d’agents à durée de vie infinie. En particulier dans un mod-
èle simple, suceptible d’éclairer l’analyse des politiques monétaires, les
régles de Taylor ne sont stabilisantes, au sens exigeant requis ici, que
lorsque les coeﬃcients de réaction sont dans une fenêtre étroite.
1 Introduction.
The “quality” of coordination of expectations, a key issue for monetary pol-
icy, obtains from diﬀerent, but interrelated, channels : both the “credibility”
of the Central Bank intervention and the ability of decentralized agents to
coordinate on a dynamical equilibrium matter. For both purposes, it is im-
portant to understand how agents learn. Indeed, many studies on monetary
policy have focused attention on learning processes involving “evolutive”,
real time learning rules (adaptive learning rules, etc. . . ).
The “eductive” viewpoint as illustrated in many references of this bib-
liography and in my 2005 MIT Press book partly abstracts from the real
time dimension of learning, with the aim of more directly capturing the sys-
tems’ characteristics that are coordination-friendly. The paper first presents
the philosophy of analysis of expectational coordination underlying the just
called "eductive" viewpoint. Giving a synthetical flavour of the "eductive"
viewpoint is a pre-requisite to the confrontation of the methods that this
viewpoint suggests with those actually adopted in most present studies of
learning in the context of macroeconomic and monetary policy. Such a con-
frontation rests on the review of existing learning results in the context of
dynamical systems, the main present field of applications of the "eductive"
method to macroeconomics1. Such applications however, have not born most
directly on monetary policy issues. Then, following the review, the paper
explores the diﬀerences for standard monetary policy analysis between the
1See in particular, Guesnerie R. (2001) “"Short run expectational coordination: Fixed
versus flexible wages." Quarterly Journal of Economics, p. 1115,1147, Evans G., R. Gues-
nerie (2005) "Coordination on saddle path solutions: the eductive viewpoint, 2 - Linear
multivariate models, Journal of Economic Theory, 2005, p.202-229.
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traditional viewpoint and this competing viewpoint. This exploration is ten-
tative, although it seems potentially promising
The paper will proceed as follows:
- It will recall the logic of the “eductive” viewpoint and stress diﬀer-
ences as well as complementarities with the “evolutive” viewpoint. (Section
2)
- It will review results that allow to compare the most standard ex-
pectational criteria and the "eductive" criterion. It will first introduce four
more or less standard criteria in the framework of a one-dimensional (Sec-
tion 3) and then multi-dimensional (Section 4) simple dynamical system. The
comparison with the "eductive" viewpoint taken in this paper will be final-
ized in Section 5. The analysis will emphasize the role of heterogeneity of
expectations and will suggest that the chosen alternative view, when applied
to an overlapping generation framework, leads to complete and deepen rather
than contradict the conclusions of more standard approaches
- However, the "eductive" analysis of a simple cashless economy un-
dertaken in Section 6, will stress, in an infinite-horizon model with infinitely-
lived agents, conditions for expectational coordination strikingly diﬀerent
from the classical ones. In particular, the "eductive" evaluation of the stabi-
lizing performance of the Taylor rule suggest that its reaction coeﬃcient to
inflation has to be severely restricted.
2 Expectational stability : the "eductive view-
point".
The notion of ”eductively stable” equilibrium or ”strongly rational equilib-
rium” relies on considerations that have game-theoretical underpinnings, and
refer to ”rationalizability”, ”dominance solvability”, ”Common Knowledge”
ideas. These concepts serve to provide a ”high tech” justification of the ex-
pectational stability criteria that are proposed. Emphasis is first put on this
”high tech” approach for proposing global stability concepts that have a
clearly ”eductive” flavour (2-A). Now, the local transposition of the global
ideas allows to stress, besides the previous ”high tech” justification, a ”low
tech”, more intuitive, interpretation (2-B). Comments are finally oﬀered on
the connections between the ”eductive” viewpoint and the standard ”evolu-
tive” learning viewpoint (2-C).
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2.1 Global "eductive" stability.
We are in a world populated of rational economic agents, (in all the fol-
lowing, I shall assume that these agents are infinitesimal and modelled as
a continuum). The agents know the logic of the collective economic inter-
actions (the underlying model). Both the rationality of the agents and the
model are Common Knowledge. The state of the system is denoted E and
belongs to some subset E of some vector space. .
Note that E can be a number, (the value of an equilibrium price or a
growth rate), a vector (of equilibrium prices,...), a function (an equilibrium
demand function), or an infinite trajectory of states, or a probability distri-
bution.
Let us elaborate on that by taking a few examples.
In the variant of the Muth model considered in Guesnerie (1992), E is
a number, the market clearing price to-morrow on the wheat market. The
agents are farmers whose crop’s profitability will depend on the wheat price.
They know the model in the sense that they understand how the market
price depends on the total amount of wheat available to-morrow : the mar-
ket clearing price, as a function of total crop, is determined from the inverse
of some demand function which is known. All this, (Bayesian) rationality and
”the model”, is known by the agents and it is known that it is known, and
it is known that it is known that it is known,.... and, with straightforward
notation, (it is known)pfor any p.(i.e it is Common Knowledge, from now
on CK).In general equilibrium models, (Guesnerie (2001), (2002)), Ghosal
(2006)), E is a vector (price vector or quantity vector). In models focus-
ing on the transmission of information through prices, (Desgranges (2002),
Desgranges-Heinemann (2005), Desgranges-Geoﬀard-Guesnerie (2003)), E is
a function, a function that relates the non-noisy part of excess demand to the
asset price. In infinite horizon models E is an infinite trajectory consisting,
at each date t, either of a number or of a vector, describing the state of the
system at this date. Introducing uncertainty in the partial equilibrium, gen-
eral equilibrium, intertemporal models just recalled lead to substitute for E
a probablity distribution over the set of finitelor infinite dimensional vectors
previously considered.
Now, let us come to equilibria on which we focus on, that are, in standard
terminology, rational expectations or perfect foresight equilibria . Emphasiz-
ing the expectational aspects of the problem, we view an equilibrium of the
system as a state E∗, such that if everybody believes that it prevails, it does
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prevail. (Note, from our previous introductory remarks, that E∗ is such that
the assertion : "it is CK that E = E∗ " is meaningful).
We say that E∗ is ”eductively” stable of ”strongly rational” iif Assertion
A implies Assertion B, (given that Bayesian rationality and the model are
CK).
Assertion A : It is CK that E ∈ E .
Assertion B : it is CK that E = E∗.
The mental process that leads from Assertion A to Assertion B is the
following.
1- As every body knows that E ∈ E , everybody knows that everybody
limits its responses to actions that best responses to some probability distri-
butions over E . It follows that everybody knows that the state of the system
will be in E(1) ⊂ E
2- If E(1) is a proper subset of E , the mental process goes on as in step
1, but based now on E(1) instead of E .
3- etc...
We then have a decreasing sequence E(n) ⊂ E(n− 1) ⊂ .... ⊂ E(1) ⊂ E .
When the sequence converges to E∗, the equilibrium is ”strongly rational”
or ”eductively” stable. When it is not the case, the limit set is the set of
rationalizable equilibria of the model. (See Guesnerie-Jara-Moroni (2007)).
Global ”eductive” stability is clearly very demanding, although it can be
shown to hold under plausible economic conditions in a variety of models,
either in partial equilibrium (Guesnerie (1992)) or general equilibrium (Gues-
nerie (2001)) standard markets contexts, in finance models of transmission
of information through prices (Desgranges-Geoﬀard-Guesnerie (2002)), or in
general settings involving strategic complementarities or substitutabilities
(Guesnerie-Jara-Moroni(2007).
2.2 Local "eductive" Stability
Local ”eductive stability” may be defined through the same ’high tech” or
hyperrationality view (2B-1). However, the local criterion has also a very
intuitive (and ”low tech” and in a sense boundedly rational, interpretation
(2B-2).
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2.2.1 Local "eductive" stability as a CK statement.
We say that E∗ is locally ”eductively” stable or locally ”strongly rational”
iif one can find some non trivial neighbourhood of E∗, V (E∗) such that
Assertion A implies assertion B.
Assertion A : It is CK that E ∈ V (E∗)
Assertion B : it is CK that E = E∗.
Hypothetically, the state of the system is assumed to be in some non-
trivial neighbourhood of E∗ and this ”hypothetically CK” assumption implies
CK of E∗.
In other words, the deletion of non-best responses, starts under the as-
sumption that the state of the system is close to the equilibrium state. In that
sense, the viewpoint refers to the same ”hyper-rationality” view as referred
to before. However, the statement can be read in a simpler way.
2.2.2 Local "eductive" stability as a common sense requirement.
It seems intuitively plausible to define local expectational stability as follows
: there exists a non trivial neighbourhood of the equilibrium such that, if
everybody believes that the state of the system is in this neighbouhood, it is
necesarily the case, whatever the specific form taken by eveybody’s belief, that
the state is in the stressed neighbouhood. Intuitively, the absence of such a
neighbourhood signals some tendancy to instability : there can be facts fal-
sifying any universally shared conjecture on the set of possible states, unless
this set reduces to the equilibrium itself.
Naturally, it is easy to check, and left to the reader, that the failure of
getting local ”expectational stability” in the precise sense defined above is
(roughly) equivalent to a failure of the just stressed local intuitive require-
ment.
2.3 "Eductive" versus "evolutive" learning stability.
There is an informal argument, due to Milgrom-Roberts (1990), according
to which, in a system that repeats itself, non best responses to existing ob-
servations will be deleted after a while, initiating a ”real time” counterpart
of the "notional" time deletion of non-best responses that underlies ”educ-
tive” reasoning. Let us focus here on the connections between local ”educ-
tive stability” and the local convergence of standard ”evolutive” learning
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rules. What local ”eductive stability”, as just defined, does involve is that
once, for whatever reasons, the (possibly stochastic) beliefs of the agents will
be trapped in V (E∗), they will remain in V (E∗), whenever updating satis-
fies natural requirements that are met in particular by Bayesian updating
rules. Although it is not quite enough to be sure that any ”evolutive” learn-
ing rule will converge, it is the case that, in many settings, one can show
that local ”eductive” stability involves that every ”reasonable” evolutive real
time learning rule converges asymptotically (see Guesnerie (2002), Gauthier-
Guesnerie (2005)). Furthermore, it should be clear that the failure to find a
set V (E∗) for which the the equilibrium is locally strongly rational, signals a
tendancy for ”reasonable” states of beliefs, close to the equilibrium, and then
likely to be reachable with some ”reasonable” evolutive updating process, to
be triggered away in some cases, a fact that threatens the convergence of the
corresponding learning rule2.
Hence, our very abstract and hyper-rational criterion, provides a short-
cut for understanding the diﬃculties of expectational coordination, without
entering into the business of specifying the real time, bounded rationality con-
siderations that may matter. Naturally, the ”eductive” criterion is in general
more demanding than most fully specified ”evolutive” learning rules one can
think of (as strongly suggested by the just sketched argument and precisely
shown in the previously referred contributions).
The connection is however less clearcut than just suggested in cases of
models with ”extrinsic uncertainty”. Then, the equilibrium is a probability
distribution, a state of the system in the sense of the word taken here is a
probability distribution. An observation is not an observation on the state in
our sense, but an information on the state in the standard sense of the word.
”Evolutive” and ”eductive learning may then diﬀer significantly..
3 Expectational criteria in infinite horizonmod-
els : one-dimensional state variable.
Models used for monetary policy generally adopt an infinite horizon ap-
proach. This section and the following review existing results on ”eductive”
stability in infinite horizon models. They are based on Gauthier (2003),
2And certainly forbids a strong form of ”monotonic” convergence.
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Evans-Guesnerie (2003, 2005), Gauthier-Guesnerie (2005). The review will
allow us later to improve the comparison of the game-theoretically oriented
viewpoint stressed in this paper with the standard macroeconomic approach
to the problem as reported in Evans-Honkappohja (2001).
We start by focusing attention on one-dimensional one step-forward mem-
ory one models.
3.1 The model
Consider a model in which the one-dimensional state of the system today
is determined from its value yesterday and its expected value tomorrow,
according to the linear (for the sake of simplicity) equation :
γE [x(t+ 1) | It] + x(t) + δx(t− 1) = 0.
where x is a one-dimensional variable γ and δ are real parameters (γ, δ 6=
0).3.
A perfect foresight trajectory is a sequence (x(t), t ≥ −1) such that
γx(t+ 1) + x(t) + δx(t− 1) = 0. (1)
in any period t ≥ 0, given the initial condition x(−1).
Assume that the equation g1 = −γg21 − δ has only two real solutions
λ1 and λ2 (which arises if and only if 1 − δγ ≥ 0) with diﬀerent moduli
(with |λ1| < |λ2| by definition). Therefore, given an initial condition x(−1),
although there are ”many” perfect foresight solutions, there are two perfect
foresight solutions having the simple form :
x(t) = λ1x(t− 1).
and x(t) = λ2x(t− 1).
They are called constant growth rates solutions.
The steady state sequence (x(t) = 0, t ≥ −1) is a perfect foresight equi-
librium if and only the initial state x(−1) equals 0. The steady state is a
sink if |λ2| < 1, a saddle if |λ1| < 1 < |λ2|, or a source if |λ1| > 1. We focus
3Such dynamics obtain in particular from linearized versions of overlapping generations
models with production, at least for particular technologies (Reichlin (1986)), or infinite
horizon models with a cash-in-advance constraint (Woodford (1988)).
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attention here on the saddle case. In this case, the solution x(t) = λ1x(t−1),
is generally called the saddle-path. It has been stressed for a long time by
economists as the ”focal” solution, on the basis of arguments that refer to ex-
pectational plausibility. We review, first, the standard expectational criteria
that are used and confirm that the saddle-path solution fits them.
3.2 The standard expectational criteria.
3.2.1 Determinacy.
The first criterion is determinacy. Determinacy means that the equilibrium
under consideration is ”locally isolated”. In our infinite horizon setting, de-
terminacy has to be viewed as a property of trajectories : a trajectory
(x(t), t ≥ −1) is determinate if there is no other equilibrium trajectory (x0(t), t ≥ −1)
that is ”close” to it. This calls for a reflection about the notion of proximity
of trajectories, i.e on the choice of a topology. Yet, the choice of the suitable
topology is open. The most natural candidate is the C0 topology, according
to which two diﬀerent trajectories (x(t), t ≥ −1) and (x0(t), t ≥ −1) are said
to be close whenever |x(t)− x0(t)| < ε, for any ε > 0 arbitrarily small, and
any date t ≥ −1. In fact, with such a concept of determinacy, the saddle-
path solution, along which x(t) = λ1x(t−1) when |λ1| < 1 < |λ2|, is the only
solution to be locally isolated, i.e determinate, in the C0 topology.
Growth rates determinacy. In the present context of models with mem-
ory, a saddle-path solution is characterized by a constant growth rate of the
state variable. This suggests that determinacy should be applied in terms
of growth rates, in which case closedness of two trajectories (x(t), t ≥ −1)
and (x0(t), t ≥ −1) would require that the ratio x(t)/x(t − 1) be close to
x0(t)/x0(t − 1) in each period t ≥ 0. This is an ingredient of a kind of C1
topology, as advocated by Evans and Guesnerie (2003). In this topology, two
trajectories (x(t), t ≥ −1) and (x0(t), t ≥ −1) are said to be close whenever
both the levels x(t) and x0(t) are close, and the ratios x(t)/x(t − 1) and
x0(t)/x0(t− 1) are close, in any period.
As stressed for example by Gauthier (2002), the examination of proximity
in terms of growth rates leads to the examination of the dynamics with perfect
foresight in terms of growth rates.
Define : g(t) = x(t)/x(t− 1),
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For any x(t−1) and any t ≥ 0, then the perfect foresight dynamics implies
:
x(t) = − [γg (t+ 1) g (t) + δ]x(t− 1).
Or
g (t) = − [γg (t+ 1) g (t) + δ] (2)
Associated with the initial perfect foresight dynamics1, is then a perfect
foresight dynamics of growth rates. The growth factor g (t) is determined at
date t from the "correct" forecast of the next growth factor g (t+ 1) . This
new dynamics 2is non-linear, and it has a one-step forward looking structure,
without predetermined variable.
We have then reassessed the problem in terms of one-dimensional one-step
forward looking models which are more familiar
3.2.2 Sunspots on growth rates
Maintaining the focus on growth rates, let us now define a concept of sunspot
equilibrium, in the neighborhood of a constant growth rate solution. Suppose
that agents a priori believe that the growth factor is perfectly correlated with
sunspots.
Namely, if the sunspot event is s = 1, 2 at date t, they a priori believe
that g(t) = g(s), that is
x(t) = g(s)x(t− 1).
Thus, their common expected growth forecast is :
E [x(t+ 1) | It] = π(s, 1)g(1)x(t) + π(s, 2)g(2)x(t),
where π(s, 1) and π(s, 2) are the sunspot transition probabilities.
As shown by Desgranges and Gauthier (2003), this consistency condition
is written :
g(s) = − [γ [π(s, 1)g(1) + π(s, 2)g(2)] g(s) + δ] (3)
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When g(1) 6= g(2),the formula defines a sunspot equilibrium on the
growth rate, as soon as the stochastic dynamics of growth rates is extended4
as
g (t) = −γE [g (t+ 1) | It] g (t)− δ.
3.2.3 Evolutive learning on growth rates.
It makes sense to learn growth rates from past observations. Agents then
update their forecast of the next period growth rates from the observation of
past or present actual rates.
Reasonable learning rules in the sense of Guesnerie (2002), Gauthier-
Guesnerie (2005) consist of adaptive learning rules that are able to ”detect
cycles of order two”.
3.2.4 Iterative Expectational Stability (IE Stability)
We shall refer here to IE-stability criterion 5(see Evans (1985), de Canio,
(1978). Lucas (1979), for early studies), and apply it to conjectures on growth
rates
Let agents a priori believe that the law of motion of the economy is given
by:
x(t) = g(τ)x(t− 1),
where g(τ) denotes the conjectured growth rate at step τ in some mental
reasoning process. Then, they expect the next state variable to be g(τ)x(t),
so that the actual value is x(t) = −δx(t − 1)/(γg(τ) + 1). Assume that all
the agents understand that the actual growth factor is −δ/(γg(τ) + 1) when
their initial guess is g(τ), they should revise their guess as
g(τ + 1) = − δ
γg(τ) + 1
. (4)
By definition, IE-stability obtains whenever the sequence (g(τ), τ ≥ 0) con-
verges (towards one of its fixed point), a fact that is interpreted as reflecting
4Clearly this equivalence relies on special assumptions about linearity and certainty
equivalence.
5This concept diﬀers from the more usual concept of Diﬀerential Expectational stability
(see Evans-Honkappohja (2001))
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the success of some mental process of learning (leading to the constant growth
rate associated with the considered fixed point). It is easy to check that this
dynamics is the time mirror of the perfect foresight dynamics of growth rate:
then, a fixed point λ1 or λ2 is locally IE-stable if and only if it is locally
unstable in the previous growth rates dynamics, that is, in this dynamics,
locally determinate.
This is, within a simple model, a somewhat careful reminder of the four
possible (and more or less standard) viewpoints on ”expectational stability”.
We want later to compare such viewpoints with the so called ”eductive view-
point” emphasized here. The next statemnt makes this comparison much
easier : it turns out that here these a priori diﬀerent approaches of the prob-
lem select the same solutions.
3.2.5 An equivalence theorem on standard ”expectational crite-
ria”
Proposition 3-1. Equivalence principle in one-step forward, memory one,
one-dimensional linear systems.
Consider a one-step forward looking model (with one lagged predetermined
variable, where γ, δ 6= 0). Assume that we are in the saddle case. Then the
following four statements are equivalent:
1. A constant growth rate solution is locally determinate in the perfect
foresight growth rate dynamics and equivalently here is determinate in the C1
topology of trajectories.
2. A constant growth rate solution is locally immune to (stationary)
sunspots on growth rates.
3. For any a priori given ”reasonable” learning rules bearing on growth
rates, a constant growth rate solution is locally asymptotically stable.
4. A constant growth rate solution is locally IE stable.
In particular, a saddle-path solution which meets requirement 1, meets
all the others.The argument of Guesnerie (2002), gathers earlier findings.
For example the fact that ”reasonable” learning processes converge relies on
a definition of ”reasonableness” integrating the suggestions of Grandmont-
Laroque (1991) and the results of Guesnerie-Woodford (1991).
We postpone to Section 5 the discussion of the comparison of the just
analysed criteria with the ”eductive” viewpoint on learning , the analysis
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of which requires the introduction of some game-theoretical flesh into the
model.
4 Standard Expectational criteria in infinite
horizonmodels : the multi-dimensional case
While keeping with one-step forward looking linear models with memory one,
we now turn to the case of a multidimensional state variable.
4.1 The framework
The dynamics of the multidimensional linear one-step forward looking econ-
omy with one predetermined variable, is now governed by :
GE (x(t+ 1) | It) + x(t) +Dx(t− 1) = 0,
where x is a n× 1 dimensional vector, G and D are two n× n matrices,
and 0 is the n× 1 zero vector. A perfect foresight equilibrium is a sequence
(x(t), t ≥ 0) associated with the initial condition x(−1), and such that :
Gx(t+ 1) + x(t) +Dx(t− 1) = 0 (5)
The dynamics with perfect foresight is governed by the 2n eigenvalues λi
(i = 1, ..., 2n) of the following matrix (the companion matrix associated with
the recursive equation)
A =
µ
−G−1 −G−1D
In (0)
¶
,
where (0) is the n-dimensional zero matrix.
In what follows, we shall be interested in the perfect foresight dynamics
restricted to a n-dimensional eigensubspace, and especially the one spanned
by the eigenvectors associated with the n roots of lowest modulus. Let assume
that the eigenvalues are distinct and define |λi| < |λj| whenever i < j (i, j =
1, ..., 2n) and focus attention on the generalized saddle case, where |λn| <
1 < |λn+1|.
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Let ui denote the eigenvector associated with λi (i = 1, ..., 2n). Since all
the eigenvalues are distinct, the n eigenvectors form a basis of the subspace
associated with λ1, ..., λn. Let:
ui =
µ
v˜i
vi
¶
where vi and v˜i are of dimension n. It is straightforward to check that if ui
is an eigenvector, then v˜i = λivi.
Hence, if we pick up some x(0), and if the n-dimensional subspace gen-
erated by (u1, ...,un) is in ”general position”, we can find a single x(1)
such that (x(0),x(1)) =
P
aiui is in the subspace and generate a sequence
(x(t), t ≥ 0), (x(1), x(2)) =
P
aiλiui, ...) following the just defined dynamics
5. This generates a solution, which is converging in the saddle-path case.
The methodology proposed for constructing "constant growth rates" so-
lution in the previous Section can be replicated to obtain what is called
minimum order solutions. Assume that
x(t) = Bx(t− 1) (6)
in every period t, and for any n-dimensional vector x(t − 1) (B is an n.n
matrix). Also, x(t+ 1) = Bx(t). Thus, it must be the case that
B = −(GB+ In)−1D
or equivalently
(GB+ In)B+D = 0 (7)
A matrix B¯ satisfying this equation6 is a minimum order solution in the sense
of Mc Callum (1983). Gauthier (2002) calls it a stationary extended growth
rate. In view of the analysis of constant growth rates solutions made in the
previous section, we use this latter terminology : we then focus attention
now on the expectational stability of "extended growth rates".
6It is shown in Evans and Guesnerie (2005) that B¯ = VΛV
−1
, where Λ is a n × n
diagonal matrix whose iith entry is λi (i = 1, . . . , n) and V is the associated matrix of
eigenvectors. In what follows, we focus attention on the saddle case, where |λn| < 1 <
|λn+1|.
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4.2 The expectational plausibility of Extended Growth
Rates (EGR) solutions according to standard cri-
teria.
We will concentrate on three of the above criteria : determinacy, immunity
to sunspots, and IE-stability.
Determinacy is viewed through a dynamics of perfect foresight of extended
growth rates that extends the dynamics of growth rates previously intro-
duced. Consider for every t, B(t) a n-dimensional matrix whose ijth entry is
equal to bij(t) and x(t) = B(t)x(t− 1). Such a matrix will be called, in line
with the just introduced terminology of "stationary extended growth rates",
an ”extended growth rate”.
Assume that such a relationship holds whatever t, so that x(t + 1) =
B(t + 1)x(t);then the dynamics with perfect foresight of the endogenous
state variable x(t) implies :
GB(t+ 1)x(t) + x(t) +Dx(t− 1) = 0
i.e
x(t) = −(GB(t+ 1) + In)−1Dx(t− 1), (8)
provided that GB(t+ 1) + In is a n-dimensional regular matrix.
Then, a perfect foresight dynamics of such matrices B(t) may be associ-
ated with a sequence of matrices (B(t), t ≥ 0) such that :
B(t) = −(GB(t+ 1) + In)−1D⇔ (GB(t+ 1) + In)B(t) +D = 0. (9)
This defines the extended growth rates perfect foresight dynamics.
Its fixed points are the stationary matrices B¯ such that B(t) = B¯, what-
ever t. They are solutions of 7.
Determinacy of the ”stationary extended growth rate” associated with
the matrix B¯, is standardly defined as the fact that (the infinite trajectory
with constant extended growth rate) B¯ is locally isolated, i.e that there
does not exist a sequence B(t) of perfect foresight extended growth rates
converging to B¯. From now on, we refer to an ”extended growth rate” as an
EGR.
A sunspot equilibrium on extended growth rates, in the spirit of previous
section, is a situation in which the whole matrixB(t) that links x(t) to x(t−1)
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is perfectly correlated with sunspots. If sunspot event is s (s = 1, 2) at date t,
so that E (x(t+ 1) | s) = [π(s, 1)B(1) + π(s, 2)B(2)]B(s)x(t−
1).
x(t) = − [G [π(s, 1)B(1) + π(s, 2)B(2)]B(s) +D]x(t− 1).
In a sunspot equilibrium, the a priori belief that B(t) = B(s) is selfulfilling
whatever x(t− 1), so that :
B(s) = − [G [π(s, 1)B(1) + π(s, 2)B(2)]B(s) +D] .
It remains for us to examine the stability properties of the (virtual time)
learning dynamics associated with the IE-stability criterion. At virtual time
τ of the learning process, agents believe that, whatever t:
x(t) = B(τ)x(t− 1),
where B(τ) is the τth estimate of the n-dimensional matrix B.
Their forecasts are accordingly:
E (xt+1 | It) = B(τ)xt.
The actual dynamics is obtained by reintroducing forecasts into the tempo-
rary equilibrium map :
GB(τ)xt + xt +Dxt−1 = o⇔ xτ = −(GB(τ) + In)−1Dxτ−1.
As a result, the dynamics with learning is written:
B(τ + 1) = −(GB(τ) + In)−1D. (10)
A stationary EGR B¯ is a fixed point of the above dynamics. It is locally
IE-stable if and only if the dynamics is converging when B(0) is close enough
to B¯.
4.3 The dynamic equivalence principle
We can state the following proposition :
Proposition 4-1. Equivalence principle in one-step forward, memory one,
multi-dimensional linear systems.
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Consider a stationary EGR.
The following three statements are equivalent:
1. The EGR solution is determinate in the perfect foresight extended
growth rates dynamics.
2. The EGR solution is immune to sunspots, that is, there are no neigh-
bour local sunspot equilibria on extended growth rates with finite support, as
defined above.
3. The EGR solution is locally IE-stable.
In particular, the saddle-path like solution (that exists when the n smallest
eigenvalues of A have modulus less than 1, the (n + 1)th having modulus
greater than 1) meets all these conditions.
The statement is proved in Gauthier-Guesnerie (2005)7.
Clearly, the flavour of this statement is very close to that of the state-
ment obtained in the one dimensional case. Note however, that the con-
nection between ”evolutive” learning and ”eductive” learning is now more
intricate. The performance of adaptive learning processes bearing on the
multi-dimensional object "extended growth rates" is less easy to assess than
in the one-dimensional situation of the previous section : part 3 of Proposi-
tion 3-1 has no counterpart here.
5 Eductive learning in dynamical models.
5.1 The underlying strategic framework.
The discussion of the basic viewpoint of ”eductive learning” requires that
some game-theoretical flesh be given to the dynamical models under scrutiny.
In other words, we need to imbed the dynamic model in a dynamic game.
We present, for the sake of completeness, the construct proposed in Evans-
Guesnerie (2003), a construct that explicitely refers to an OLG context.
At each period t, there exists a continuum of agents. A part of the agents
“react to expectations”, another part uses strategies which are not reactive
to expectations (in an OLG context, these are the agents, who are at the last
period of their lives)8. The former are denoted ωt and belong to a convex
7The equivalence of 1 and 3 follows easily from the above definitions and sketch of
analysis. The reader will convince himself that the equivalence with 2 is plausible.
8It is assumed that an agent of period t is diﬀerent from any other agent of period
t
0
, t
0 6= t.This means either that each agent is “physically” diﬀerent or that the agents
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segment of R, endowed with Lebesgue measure dωt. More precisely, agent ωt
has a (possibly indirect) utility function that depends upon:
1) his own strategy s(ωt),
2) suﬃcient statistics of the strategies played by others i.e. upon yt =
F (Πωt {s(ωt)} , ∗), where F in turn depends first, upon the strategies of all
agents who at time t react to expectations, and second, upon (∗), which
is here supposed to represent suﬃcient statistics of the strategies played
by those who do not react to expectations, and that includes but is not
necessarily identified with yt−1,
3) finally upon the suﬃcient statistics for time t+1, as perceived at time
t, i.e. upon yt+1(ωt), which may be random and also, now directly, upon the
t− 1 suﬃcient statistics yt−1.
We assume that the strategies played at time t can be made conditional
on the equilibrium value of the t suﬃcient statistics yt. Now, let (•) denote
both (the product of) yt−1 and the probability distribution of the random
variable y˜t+1(ωt), (the random subjective forecasts held by ωt of yt+1). Let
then G(ωt, yt, •) be the best response function of agent ωt. Under these as-
sumptions, the suﬃcient statistics for the strategies of agents who do not
react to expectations is (∗) = (yt−1, yt).
The equilibrium equations at time t are written:
yt = F [Πωt {G(ωt, yt, yt−1, y˜t+1(ωt))} , yt−1, yt] . (11)
Note that when all agents have the same point expectations denoted yet+1,
the equilibrium equations determine what is called the temporary equilibrium
mapping
Q(yt−1, yt, yet+1) = yt − F
£
Πωt
©
G(ωt, yt, yt−1, yet+1)
ª
, yt−1, yt
¤
.
Also assuming that all y˜t+1 have a very small common support “around”
some given yet+1, decision theory suggests that G, to the first order, depends
on the expectation of the random variable y˜t+1(ωt) that is denoted yet+1(ωt)
(and is close to yet+1), we are able to linearize (11), around any initially given
situation, denoted (0), as follows:
yt = U(0)yt + V (0)yt−1 +
Z
W (0, ωt)yet+1(ωt)dωt,
have strategies that are independent from period to period. In an OLG interpretation of
the model, each agent lives for two periods but only reacts to expectations in the first
period of his life.
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where yt, yt−1, yet+1(ωt) now denote small deviations from the initial values of
yt, yt−1, yt+1, and U(0), V (0),W (0, ωt) are n× n square matrices.
If such a linearization is considered only around a steady state of the sys-
tem, yt, yt−1, etc., will denote deviations from the steady state and U(0), V (0),W (0, ωt)
are simply U, V,W (ωt).
Adding an invertibility assumption, we get two reduced forms :
- the standard temporary equilibrium reduced form, associated with ho-
mogenous expectations, (yet+1(ωt) = y
e
t+1, ), is :
yt = Byet+1 +Dyt−1, (12)
- the "stochastic beliefs" reduced form is :
yt = Dyt−1 +B
Z
Z(ωt)yet+1(ωt)dωt, (13)
where
R
Z(ωt)dωt = I.
"Eductive" Stability will be analysed from this latter reduced form13.
5.2 ”Eductive Stability”
5.2.1 One-dimensional setting.
>From the above analysis, it seems natural to make beliefs indexed with
growth rates (as underlined in Evans- Guesnerie (2003), beliefs on the proxim-
ity of trajectories in the C0 sense have not enough grip on the agents’actions).
Hence, the hypothetical Common Knowledge assumption, to be taken
into account, concerns growth rates, (the C1 topology).
(Hypothetical) CK Assumption. The growth rate of the system is be-
tween λ1 −  and λ1 + 
Such an assumption on growth rates triggers a mental process that, in
successful cases, progressively reinforces the initial restriction and converges
towards the solution. The mental process takes into account the variety
of beliefs associated with the initial restriction. Common beliefs with point
expectations are then a particular case, and it is intuitively easy to guess
that convergence of the general mental process under consideration implies
convergence of the special process under examination when studying IE-
stability. This is stressed as such : IE-stability is a necessary condition of
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eductive stability (Evans and Guesnerie (2003)). It then follows, from the
above "equivalence theorem" (Proposition 3-1) of Section 3 :
Proposition 5-1 :
If a constant growth rate solution is locally ”eductively stable” or ”locally
strongly rational” then it is determinate in growth rates, locally IE stable,
locally immune to susnpots, and attracts all reasonable evolutive learning
rules.
Hence ”Eductive Stability” is more demanding in general than all the
previous equivalent criteria. The fact that it is strictly more demanding is
shown in the Evans-Guesnerie (2003)’s paper, although it becomes equally
demanding when some behavioural homogeneity condition is introduced.
5.2.2 Multi-dimensional setting
In a natural way, the hypothetical Common Knowledge assumption, to be
taken into account has to bear on extended growth rates.
(Hypothetical) CK Assumption. The extended growth rate of the sys-
tem B belongs to V (B), where V (B)is a neighbourhood in the space of
matrices (that has to be defined with respect to some distance, normally
evaluated from some matrix norm)
As we said earlier, if Common Knowledge of B ∈ V (B). ⇒ B = B, then
the solution is localy ”eductively” stable or locally Strongly Rational.
As in the one-dimensional case, one can show, using now Proposition 4-1.
Proposition 5-2 :
If a stationnary extended growth rate solution is locally ”eductively stable”
or ”locally strongly rational” then it is determinate, locally IE stable, locally
immune to susnpots.
Again, ”Eductive Stability” is more demanding in general than all the
standard and, as stressed earlier, equivalent criteria. The reason is that it
takes into account
1- the stochastic nature of beliefs,
2- the heterogeneity of beliefs.
Both dimensions are explicitely neglected in the Iterative Expectational
stability construct, and implicitely in the other equivalent constructs. In fact,
as soon as local ”eductive” stability is concerned, the results of Guesnerie-
Jara-Moroni (2007), although obtained in a diﬀerent context make clear that,
in a local context, point-expectations and stochastic expectations do not
make so much diﬀerence. Hence, locally at least, the key diﬀerences between
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Strong Rationality and and standard expectational stability criteria would
come from the heterogeneity of expectations.
5.2.3 Standard expectational coordination approaches and the ”educ-
tive” viewpoint : a tentative conclusion.
Let us note first that our attempt at comparing the standard expectational
coordination criteria, determinacy, absence of neighbour sunspot equilibria,
IE-stability, has been limited to the above class of models. An exhaustive
attempt would have to extend the class of models under scrutiny in diﬀerent
directions.
- Introduce uncertainty (intrinsic uncertainty) in the models of pre-
vious sections. The analysis should extend, with some technical diﬃculties,
the appropriate objects under scrutiny being then respectively, probability
distributions on growth rates and extended growth rates. It is reasonable to
conjecture that the above equivalence proposition of Section 4 would have a
close counterpart in the new setting.
- Introduce longer memory lags and/or more forward looking percep-
tions. The theory seems applicable although the concept of ”extended growth
rate” becomes more intricate (Gauthier (2004)).
The next set of remarks brings us back to the models used in mone-
tary theory (starting for example from Sargent-Wallace (1975)). A number
of these models have a structure analogous to the ones examined here, al-
though they often involve intrinsic uncertainty. This suggest two provisional
conclusions that will be put under scrutiny in the next section.
1- The standard criterion used in monetary theory for assessing expecta-
tional coordination, local determinacy, is less demanding than the ”eductive”
criterion. This can be seen, within the present perspective, as the reflection
of a neglect of a dimension of heterogeneity of expectations that is present
in the problem.
2- However, the connections between the ”evolutive viewpoint” and the
”eductive” one are less clearcut than in our prototype model. Diﬀerences
have two sources :
- The theoretical connection between the two types of learning is less
well established in the multidimensional case, that often obtains in mone-
tary models of the new Keynesian type, than in the one-dimensional one.
(Proposition 3-1-3 has no counterpart in Proposition 4-1)
- In a noisy system, agents do not observe, at each step, a "state" of
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the system, as defined in our construct, i.e a probability distribution, but a
random realisation drawn from this probability distribution. Learning rules,
aiming at being eﬃcient, have to react slowly to new information. Intuitively,
IE stability and consequently eductive stability will be more demanding local
criteria than success of, necessarily slow, evolutive learning.
However, the above analysis and its just suggested provisional conclusions
implicitely refer to a truly overlapping generations framework. The equations
from which the expectational coordination aspects of monetary policy are
most often examined are indeed of the ”overlapping form” but come from
infinite horizon models. Their interpretation, within the framework of an
”eductive” analysis should hence be diﬀerent. We will stress this, sometimes
considerable, diﬀerence in the next and final Section.
6 "Eductive stability’ in a cashless economy.
The objective here is to introduce very simple versions or models that are
used for the discussion of monetary policy and of the Central Bank policy.
Indeed attention will be focused here on a simple model of a cashless economy,
in the sense of Woodford (2003).
6.1 The model, and the standard viewpoint.
Let us consider an economy populated by a continuum of identical agents,
living for ever. Each agent α 9receive y units of a perishable good at every
period. There is money and the good has a money price Pt at each period,
The agents have an identical utility function
U =
X
βtu(Ct)
where u(Ct) will be taken as iso-elastic
u(Ct) = [1/(1− σ)](Ct)(1−σ)
.First order conditions are :
(1 + it) = (1/β)[u0(Ct+1)/u0(Ct)](Pt/Pt+1)−1 = (1/β)(Pt+1/Pt)[
Ct
Ct+1
]σ
9Although we shall keep in mind the continuum interpretation, the reasoning will for-
mally refer to a representative consumer, leaving aside the notation α.
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where it is the nominal interest rate.
The Central bank decides on a nominal interest rate according to a Wick-
sellian rule. We assume that this rule takes the form
imt = φ(Pt/Pt−1)
where φ is increasing.
We assume also that the targeted inflation rate is Π∗ > β so that
1 + φ(Π∗) = Π∗/β.
The money price at time 0 is denoted P ∗0 . The targeted price path is
P ∗t = P
∗
0 (Π
∗)t
.
Indeed, the economy is considered as starting at time 1.
We note that the path Pt = P ∗t , Ct(α) = y, t = 1, 2, ... + ∞, defines
a Rational Expectations, here a Perfect Foresight, Equilibrium, associated
with a nominal interest rate φ(Π∗) = (Π∗/β)− 1.
Is this equilibrium determinate ? It should be noted that, since all
agents are similar and face the same conditions in any equilibrium, any equi-
librium has to meet Ct(α) = y. It follows that any other (perfect foresight)
equilibrium {P 0t} has to meet :
(1 + φ(P 0t/P
0
t−1))β = (P
0
t+1/P
0
t)
which can be written, using πt as the inflation rate :
(1 + φ(πt)) = πt+1.
Any equilibrium close to the stationary equilibrium Π∗ would satisfy (with
straigthforward notation) :
φ0(∗)β(δπt) = (δπt+1)
an equation incompatible with the proximity of the new equilibrium trajec-
tory to the steady state trajectory, as soon as φ0(∗)β > 1.
In other words, if φ0(∗) > (1/β), which is the form taken here by the
Taylor rule, then the equilibrium is locally determinate.
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Note that :
- The above sketched argument does not demonstrate, as such, that,
outside the neighbourhood under consideration, there are no other perfect
foresight equilibria, although the one under scrutiny is the only stationary
one
- If we accept to view the equations as coming from an OLG framework,
we would argue that the equilibrium is locally IE-Stable, or even here locally
"eductively" stable. Indeed, assume that a) it is initially CK that inflation
will remain for ever in a neighbourhood of Π∗. Take into account the fact
that b) : it is CK that a (general) departure in inflation expectation of δπt+1
involves a departure in period t inflation of δπt = 1βφ0 δπt+1 Assertions a) and
b) together do imply that the steady inflation state ∗ is CK. In other words,
the equilibrium * is locally "eductively stable"10.
However, assertion b) which is a core element of the construction in an
OLG framework, makes no full sense here, where what happens today does
not only depend on the expectations concerning tomorrow, but necessarily
on the whole trajectory of beliefs of the agents. To put it in another way, the
fact that the to-morrow (period (t + 1)) inflation expectation is πt+1has no
final bite on what the equilibrium price may be today in period t. Indeed,
demand of an agent at period t, as seen from period 1 is :
Ct(α) = C1(α)
h
β(t−1/σ)Πt−11 [(1 + is)(Ps/Ps+1)]
1/σ
i
At period t,agent α may be viewed as determining its demand as follows :
- Take Ct(α) as a starting parameter and compute the infinite sequence
Ct+τ(α) = Ct(α)
h
β(τ−1)/σΠt+τ−1t [(1 + is)(Ps/Ps+1)]
1/σ
i
.
- Then choose Ct(α) so that it meets the consumer’s discounted intertem-
poral budget constraint.
Clearly, such a computation has to be fed by the whole agents’ beliefs
over the period and not only by their beliefs over the next period ! In
other words, the connection between t and t + 1 emphasized above for the
analysis of "eductive stability" only captures one intermediate step of the
10Strictly speaking, the sketched argument only shows that the equilibrium ∗ is locally
IE-stable. The fact that agents are identical here is more than needed to insure that
heterogeneity of beliefs does not matter, so that IE stability implies Eductive Stability.
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choice procedure and not, as it would do in a true OLG framework, the
whole story.
The right question is then the following : assume that it is the case that
hypothetically it is CK that πs is close to Π∗s = Π
∗, then is it the case that
the equilibrium is CK ? We answer this question in the next Section.
6.2 "Eductive" Stability in the infinite horizon cash-
less economy : preliminaries.
Let us consider the world at time 1.
Let us assume that, at the margin of the stationnary equilibrium, where
the real interest rate is r∗, a small departure drs, s = 1, ...,is expected by
all the agents. It does not matter, at this stage, whether such a departure
comes from a(n) (expected) change in nominal interest rate or an expected
change in inflation. We ask the question : given these changes in beliefs, what
is the new first period equilibrium ?
Naturally, consumption will not change in period 1, the only adjustment
variable is the first period interest rate that will become r∗ + dr1. What will
be the equilibrium dr1 ?
The answer is given by Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 The new equilibrium real interest rate is, to the first order ap-
proximation, r∗ + dr1,with :
dr1 = −
β
(1− β))(dr2)
Proof. Consider the first order conditions :
Ct(α) = C1(α)
h
β((t−1)/σ)Πt−11 [(1 + rs)
1/σ
i
Take the Log :
LogCt = LogC1 + ((t− 1)/σ)Logβ + (1/σ)
t−1X
1
Log(1 + rs)
so that, approximately, in the neighbourhood of the stationary equilibrium
with consumtion C∗, and interest rate r∗, (with : β(1 + r∗) = 1)
dCt
C∗ =
dC1
C∗ +
β
σ
(
t−1X
s=1
drs)
25
Let us single out the adjustment variable dr1 :
dCt
C∗ =
dC1
C∗ +
β
σ
dr1 +
β
σ
(
t−1X
s=2
drs)
We now make a key remark : the expected price change only induces a sec-
ond order welfare change for the consumer. As is known from consumption
theory11, the welfare change, obtains, to the first order approximation, as the
inner product of the price change and of the market exchange vector (the dif-
ference between the consumption and the endowment vector). As this latter
vector is zero, the result obtains. Now, the above finding implies that :
+∞X
1
βt−1(
dCt
C∗ ) = 0
Let us compute the above expression :
+∞X
1
βt−1(
dCt
C∗ ) = (
1
1− β )(
dC1
C∗ ) +
1
σ
[
+∞X
2
βt(dr1 + (
t−1X
s=2
drs))]
In the case drs = dr2, ∀s,we have :
+∞X
1
βt−1(
dCt
C∗ ) = (
1
1− β )(
dC1
C∗ ) +
1
σ
[
+∞X
2
βt[(dr1) +
+∞X
3
(t− 2)βt(dr2)]
Which, as
P+∞
2 β
t = β2/(1− β),
P+∞
3 (t− 2)βt = β3/(1− β)2, implies :
(
dC1
C∗ ) = −
β2
σ
(dr1)− (β3/σ)(1− β))(dr2)
As in equilibrium dC1 = 0, the result follows.
11The fact that we are in an infinite comodity setting does not modify the part of the
theory we are soliciting.
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6.3 "Eductive Stability" ; the core analysis.
As explained above, we implicitely assume that the model, as well as ratio-
nality, are CK. Also the monetary rule of the Central Bank (φ) is credibly
committed and hence believed.
The initial CK restriction. As argued above the initial CK restriction has
to be a hypothetical restriction on the state of the system. Here the state
of the system is entirely defined, once the monetary rule is adopted, by the
sequence of inflation rates. As the equilibrium inflation rate is Π∗, a natural
local restriction on beliefs is that the inflation rate is between [Π∗−, Π∗+].
The question is then : does such a belief trigger a collective mental process
leading to the general conclusion that ∗ will emerge ?
The process under discussion takes place in period 1.
In order to understand this process, we now look at the following question
: what will happen if in period 1, all agents believe that future inflation will
be for ever Π∗ +  ?
The expected price path will then be P
0
t = P1(Π
∗ + )t−1, t = 2, ...+∞
The expected real interest rate between t and t+ 1, t ≥ 2 will be :
(1 + ϕ(Π∗ + ))
Π∗ + 
i.e will approximately diﬀer from r∗by :
(1/(Π∗)2)[ϕ0Π∗ − (1 + ϕ)]
i.e
1/(Π∗)[ϕ0 − 1/β]
At period one, I assume that agents make plans contingent on the interest
rate (they submit a demand curve). Then, their conditional inference of the
nominal interest rate is : ϕ(P1/P ∗0 ).
Concerning their inference of the next period price P2, 12, P2 = P1(Π∗+).
Hence the expected real interest rate is
[1 + ϕ(P1/P
∗
0 )]/(Π
∗ + )
12A diﬀerent assumption on beliefs would be to see the expected price path as : P
0
t =
P ∗0 (Π
∗ + )t, t = 2, ...+∞
so that in period 1, P e2 = P
∗
0 (Π
∗ + )2.
This leads to slightly diﬀerent results.
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i.e, approximately, when writing the first period inflation rate (P1/P ∗0 ) =
(Π∗ − 0),
:
(ϕ00/Π∗)− (1 + ϕ)/(Π∗)2 = (1/Π∗)(ϕ00 − (1/β))
Putting v = ϕ0, we get the next lemma :
Lemma 2 Under the just considered state of beliefs, the first period inflation
rate is (Π∗ − 0),where
v0 = [(1/β)− ( β
(1− β)))(v − 1/β)]
Proof. We apply the above formula
dr1 = −
β
(1− β))(dr2)
,with
dr2 = 1/(Π∗)[ϕ0 − 1/β]
and
dr1 = (1/Π
∗)(ϕ00 − (1/β))
With ϕ0 = v,we have :
v0 = [(1/β)− ( β
(1− β)))(v − 1/β)]
We are now in a position to give our main result.
Proposition 6.
A necessary condition for "strong rationality" of the equilibrium is (1/β) ≤
v ≤ (1/β)[(1/(2β − 1)].
Reminding 1+ r∗ = 1/β,the condition can also be written, (1+ r∗) ≤ v ≤
(1+r∗)2
(1−r∗)
Proof. For "eductive stability" it must be the case that the initial belief is
not self defeating. For that it must be the case that
−1 ≤ [(1/βv)− ( β
(1− β)))(1− 1/βv)] ≤ 1
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Take the inequality ≤ 1. It follows that :
(1/βv)(1− β + β)/(1− β) ≤ 1 + ( β
(1− β)))
or
(1/βv) ≤ 1
Take the inequality −1 ≤ []. Then,
(1/βv)(1− β + β)/(1− β) ≥ −1 + ( β
(1− β))
or
(1/βv) ≥ (−1 + 2β)
or
v ≤ (1/β)[ 1
(2β − 1)]
Indeed one conjecture that this necessary condition is suﬃcient, as soon
as one specify the initial set of beliefs as avoiding "sweeping" beliefs (i.e
alternating expectations of high and low inflation). In the sense of our general
discussion of section 1, this is like choosing an appropriate topology for the
neighbourhood of the steady state (sweeping beliefs being considered as "non
close" to the initial one13). The proof would consist in showing that the initial
beliefs induces a smaller deviation from the targeted inflation, not only at
the first period but at any period, and then to iterate the argument using
the CK assumption.
The result is striking : the range of v = ϕ0, insuring "eductive stability"
is rather small : with β close to 1, the condition looks roughly as :
(1/β) ≤ v ≤ (1/β)[(1 + 2(1− β))
and for the sake of illustration with a high β = 0, 95, this is roughly
(1, 05) ≤ v ≤ (1, 05)(1, 1) = (1, 15)
More generally, for small r*, the "window" for the reaction coeﬃcient is,
to the first order approximation [1 + r∗, 1 + 2r∗]
13This is reminiscent of the distinction between C0 and C1 topology in the discussion of
Section 3.
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Hence the analysis suggests that standard Taylor rules are too reactive.
It is also particularly striking, but not surprising, that a plausible intuition
within the determinacy viewpoint, i.e the equilibrium is more determinate,
and in sense more expectationnaly stable whenever v increases, is plainly
wrong here; there is a small window, above 1/β, (and shrinking with β and
vanishing when β tends to 1), for expectational stability.
7 Conclusion.
The conclusion is necessarily provisionnal, since an outsider’s random walk
in monetary models, (although starting from a hopefully well established
base camp), has to be confronted with criticism. It has also to be enriched
in order to develop an intuition somewhat missing in the present state of
the author’s understanding of the specialized issues that have been touched.
This outsider’s walk has however attempted to raise interesting questions
for insiders and then will hopefully open new fronts of thinking.
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